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How should the collapse of the world financial system affect 
economics? - Part III 
 
Editor’s note 
The Dahlem Group on Economics Modeling and Tony Lawson were invited to respond to the 
following question. 
It is agreed that the current economic crisis has shown that the standard models of 
academic economics are seriously wanting. Should the main emphasis of reform be 
on developing new formal models or to an opening up of economics to methods other 
than traditional modelling? 
Neither of the respondents saw the other’s contribution before submitting theirs. 
 
 
 
Mathematics, Methods, and Modern Economics 
The Dahlem Group on Economic Modeling∗: David Colander, Hans Foellmer, Armin Haas, 
Alan Kirman, Katarina Juselius, Brigitte Sloth, Thomas Lux 
 
 
 On the title page of Foundations of Economic Analysis (Samuelson, 1947) quotes J. 
Willard Gibb’s famous line “Mathematics is a language.” While correct (there is little that is in 
Samuelson that is not correct), the quotation may also be misleading because it suggests that 
there is one mathematics. In our view there are many, and it would have been preferable to 
say that mathematics is many languages.  
 
 The key to the appropriate use of mathematics in economics is to find the right 
mathematics to use for the right problem, and not to claim more for a mathematical model 
than it delivers. The reality is that in economics there is no perfect mathematics, which means 
that to appropriately use mathematics and formal models within economics, one must 
continually be aware of not only the mathematical model, but also the limitations imposed on 
interpreting the model by the assumptions imposed by the mathematics.  Keynes put it nicely:  
Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing 
models which are relevant to the contemporary world. It is compelled to be this, 
because, unlike the typical natural science, the material to which it is applied is, in too 
many respects, not homogeneous through time. The object of a model is to segregate 
the semi-permanent or relatively constant factors from those which are transitory or 
fluctuating so as to develop a logical way of thinking about the latter, and of 
understanding the time sequences to which they give rise in particular cases. Good 
economists are scarce because the gift for using "vigilant observation" to choose 
good models, although it does not require a highly specialized intellectual technique, 
appears to be a very rare one. (Keynes, 1938) 
 
                                                     
∗This group was organized as part of the 98th Dahlem Workshop, “Is there a Mathematics of 
Social Entities?.” The group’s specified task was to consider the modeling of financial 
markets. As part of our duties there we wrote a paper entitled “The Financial Crisis and the 
Systemic Failure of Academic Economics” which we posted on the web 
(http://ideas.repec.org/p/kie/kieliw/1489.html.) The paper generated significant discussion, 
including a paper by Tony Lawson to which the editor has asked us to respond. (One of the 
original members, Michael Goldberg, chose not to participate in this response.)  
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This view of the use of models within economics follows John Stuart Mill’s views (Mill, 1844) 
that formal models provide us only with half-truths, and we should always keep that in mind 
both when developing models and when using models to interpret reality.  
 We are reminded of the above quotations when reading Lawson’s critique of our 
Dahlem Report (Colander et al 2008). In it, Lawson (Lawson, 2009) uses our report as a 
jumping off point to restate his views on modeling and models. Since he uses our report in 
that way, and does not directly criticize us, we believe that, after a careful reading, if one 
interprets the nuances of his statements in a sympathetic way, there is little in the way of 
disagreement that we have with him, or that he seems to have with our report. In our view, 
where he seems to disagree, the disagreement results from the way he chooses to interpret 
our words, by which we mean that he reads into them an interpretation that allows him to 
make the points he wants to make.  
 Let us just give one example. Lawson agrees with us that there is concern about the 
way in which models have been used in macro and in finance, but argues that the problem is 
with “mathematical deductivist modeling per se.” (pg 760) He objects to our alleged support 
for “developing new formalistic models in their place, ones that are appropriate for our current 
exceptional times.” He quotes our statement as support for that interpretation. Here is the 
quotation:  
 
The implicit view behind standard equilibrium models is that markets and economies 
are inherently stable and that they only temporarily get off track. The majority of 
economists thus failed to warn policy makers about the threatening system crisis and 
ignored the work of those who did. Ironically, as the crisis has unfolded, economists 
have had no choice but to abandon their standard models and to produce hand-
waving common-sense remedies. Common-sense advice, although useful, is a poor 
substitute for an underlying model that can provide much-needed guidance for 
developing policy and regulation. It is not enough to put the existing model to one 
side, observing that one needs, “exceptional measures for exceptional times”. What 
we need are models capable of envisaging such “exceptional times”. 
Notice the difference between our statement and the way he interprets it. We call for a model 
capable of envisaging such “exceptional times” as we have recently experienced. We say 
nothing about “deductivist modeling.” He states that we are looking for a “formalistic” model 
whereas we only call for an “underlying model.”  Lawson’s replacement of “formalistic” for 
“underlying,” his addition of deductivist, and his  removal of our call for a model capable of 
“envisioning” exceptional times are major changes in our wording and our meaning. That 
interpretation gives him a springboard into his argument against the use of mathematics in 
economics, but, in our view, does not engage our argument.  
 Our Dahlem Report was the result of a five-day intensive discussion, and then much 
coordination work after that in finding just those words and phrasing that included our many 
different views. The discussion that led to that statement in our report was a wide ranging 
one. We considered many different types of models and mathematics—non-linear dynamic 
models, game theory models, many variations of empirical models, and agent-based 
computational models. All of them could have varying degrees of formalism associated with 
them, and could be more or less deductivist in nature. Our report had nothing to say about 
how formal or what type of modeling should be done, other than whatever model one had 
should be able to “envision such exceptional times” as the world economy experienced in 
2008.  
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 Our primary point was that the macro economy was complex and the underlying 
model that economists need to have in the back of their minds had to envisage that 
complexity. This means that the mathematics that we use to deal with it had to be interpreted 
within the context of that complexity. We felt that some of the standard models were not being 
so interpreted, and that not to do so was a serious problem. We did not express our views on 
which mathematics to use or how formal the model should be; those questions were just not 
issues that we were addressing.  
This means that we came to no particular view on the proposition posed to us by the editor.   
 
It is agreed that the current economic crisis has shown that the standard 
models of academic economics are seriously wanting. Should the main 
emphasis of reform be on developing new formal models or to an opening up 
of economics to methods other than traditional modelling? 
We do not believe that we should be telling the economics profession what method they 
should be using. In our view, the main emphasis in choosing a method should be on what 
works—what adds insight to our understanding. Thus, some economists should be 
developing formal models, some should be developing agent based modeling, some should 
be developing heuristic models, some should be developing statistical models, some should 
be bringing formal models to the data, and some should be trying to integrate the various 
approaches. In short, researchers should be using whatever approach to understanding that 
the researcher finds useful.  
 In doing that research, however, we believe that all economists should be concerned 
about understanding and developing a model that is capable of envisaging the events that 
occur in the economy, and should be clear about its limitations as a guide for real-world 
policy. Put another way we believe that modelers should be modest in their claims for what 
they have found—carefully spelling out a model’s limits, and pointing out inappropriate uses 
of the model by others. If someone draws implications from a model that cannot be 
legitimately drawn, the modeler should publicly point that out.   
 We also believe that researchers should interpret the work of others with a generosity 
of interpretation that they would want from others. In our view, mathematical models are not 
the problem; it is the inappropriate use and interpretation of models that is the problem, and 
the solution lies in being more careful about using and interpreting models, not in any general 
methodological prescription for or against mathematical modeling. We believe that 
appropriate modesty of claims and generosity of interpretation will lead to better discussions 
and advancement of knowledge (what J.M Clarke (1947) called “communicability”) than will 
strongly-worded methodological debates.   
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